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**The United States In International Peacekeeping: Issues
Of National Strategy, Service Doctrine, And Operational
Necessity**

Prepared by
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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: The United States in International Peacekeeping: Issues of National Strategy, Service Doctrine, and Operational Necessity

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The Bush and Clinton Administrations have both come on line to support increased US involvement in international peacekeeping. However, so far the stated commitment has had little substance, and within the military establishment there has been little recognition of the possibility of action. Given the possibility of an unprecedented opportunity to affect the "New World Order" through a renewal of the visionary role of the United Nations, this paper looks at the need for clear national objectives transmitted into actional military doctrine and operational concepts.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Buckingham (B.Sc. Criminal Justice, Washington State University, and M.A. Criminal Justice, California State University) is a career Security Police officer. He has had three European tours where he was a member of the USAFE-NATO Inspection Team and an Exchange Officer to the Royal Air Force Regiment. He has also served as a squadron commander on two occasions: the 363 Security Police Squadron, Shaw AFB, South Carolina (1985-88) and the 1 Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB, Virginia (1991-93). Under his command, both units earned the Tactical Air Command's Best Security Police Unit designation for 1986 and 1991.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Today's world is considerably different than it was just a few years ago. The accepted norm was a bi-polar driven conflict of interests between the US and the Soviet Union that had held the world in a virtual stalemate for almost 50 years. But today, all that is gone, and many world leaders have looked at the demise of the "Cold War" with great expectations of global peace and prosperity. However, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the states that it had held in check, there is now a new set of challenges that face the world community. It is how we may chose to face these "challenges" that is now foremost in many people's minds.

Current national military strategy is being developed to meet what former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin called the "Era of New Dangers" to our national interests. The new dangers fall into four broad categories: dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; regional dangers; dangers to democracy and reform; and economic dangers. (1:1-2) The Secretary went on to say, "...[Our] armed forces are central to combating the first two dangers and can play a significant role in meeting the second two." (1:2)

Of the four dangers, the first three are also in the direct interest and scope of the United Nations (UN) in its role as provider of "collective security," the primary purpose for which it was founded in 1945. (2:109-10) In fact, with the close of the adversarial decades of the Cold War, the opportunity to regain that original objective of the UN Charter is greater now than ever before.

There has been a renewal of that visionary role in many different international, political, and military arenas. Those voices have ranged from within the UN to the nations that have traditionally supported peacekeeping efforts through supplying troops and material. If the United Nations does take up the "banner" of "provider," then what some have called the "Peace Corporations" may be just around the next corner in the evolution of a truly different and peaceful world. (3:229-30)

Given the possibility of an unprecedented opportunity to affect what President Bush called the "New World Order," the United States must be prepared to meet any new role under the umbrella of peacekeeping through well-defined objectives and clear direction given at the national level. Additionally, senior military planners must prepare doctrine that fully supports the national objective. Finally, operational planners,

at the individual service-level, must cover all aspects of such operations ranging from force structure to training.

In taking a first step in developing a strategy on peacekeeping, it is important to start with a clear definition. Using United Nations terminology: "...[it] traditionally involves using military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted rules of engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated." This role is sometimes confused with or incorrectly related to "peace-enforcing" which entails the "actual use of military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state." (4:51) The difference is very important when considering the role of the United States and the concerns associated with international intervention. Peacekeeping is covered under Chapter 6, while peace-enforcing is in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. (4:50) The need to clearly define one over the other may be even more important when seen in light of the recent Somalia operations, which seems to lapse into the gray area between chapters.

The underlying theme of this paper is to point out that the United States must take actions to clearly define its role in peacekeeping, and subsequently, to tackle the imposing task of defining any role the US may envision for its military forces in the much more controversial role of peace-enforcer. By

establishing a clear direction of purpose in both areas, the role of world leadership President Bush spoke of will be also be more clearly defined. That clarity of purpose and role is not only important for the American public, but also for other nations looking to the US for decisive action and leadership.

With that in mind, the US can help to bring about a stronger United Nations, thereby ensuring a truly international peacekeeping agency. To that end, particular attention will be given to the formulation of US strategy in this area. Additionally, the "pros and cons on the activation" of the highly controversial Article 43 of the United Nations Charter as to how it might be used to benefit US national objectives will be discussed. (5)

*You may not be interested in war,
but war is interested in you.
-- Trotsky*

CHAPTER II

STARTING AT THE TOP

Starting at 11:02EDT, September 21, 1992, before the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, then President of

the United States, George Bush, outlined what he believed to be the three critical challenges the community of nations and the United Nations will face into the 21st Century. Of the three, the President listed as first the role of the United Nations as peacekeeper:

"First, we face the political challenge of keeping today's peace and preventing tomorrow's wars. As we see daily in Bosnia and Somalia and Cambodia, everywhere conflict claims innocent lives, the need for enhanced peacekeeping capabilities has never been greater, the conflicts we deal with more intractable, the costs of conflict higher." (6:2)

Having set the stage early in his address, the President went on to commend the United Nations on its past efforts, but then moved to urge the body to do more by developing concrete responses in five key areas:

"One: Robust peacekeeping requires men and equipment...develop and train military units for possible peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief...available on short notice...

Two: If multinational units are to work together, they must train together...require coordinated command-and-control and interoperability of equipment and communications...efforts should linkup with regional organizations...

Three: We also need to provide adequate logistical support for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations...should designate stockpiles of resources...

Four: We will need to develop planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities...

And five: We must ensure adequate, equitable financing for UN and associated peacekeeping efforts."
(6:3-4)

Before moving on to other roles he envisioned for the UN, President Bush added a United States commitment to support UN peacekeeping efforts:

"As I said, we must change our national institutions if we are to change our international relations. So let me assure you: The United States is ready to do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping...For decades, the American military has served as a stabilizing presence around the globe. And I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the peace to support UN peacekeeping...I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. Because of peacekeeping's growing importance as a mission for the United States military, we will emphasize training of combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities...work to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities...offer our capabilities for joint simulations and exercises...directed the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in US military schools. Training plainly is key...I do believe that we must think differently about how we ensure and pay for our security in this new era." (6:4-5)

No matter how loosely this address is taken, the President had openly, and most assuredly, placed the United States and its armed forces right in the middle of the peacekeeping role. There is little doubt at the time of this speech, President Bush was fairly sure that he would be reelected to office in the November elections. As we all know, that did not happen.

When the newly elected President took office in January, 1993, there was considerable speculation on his relationship with the armed services and his concept of their roles, missions, and functions. Additionally, the longer positions such as Secretary

of Defense and the service secretaries stayed vacant, the more the concern increased.

Although some changes have been made to the past administration's military policies and programs, by-and-large, the majority of changes have followed what the services felt to be the original game plan. Part of that plan had been the previously stated role of the United States as a major player in the UN peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, what may have been the initial get-acquainted period with a new administration was misread as a reluctance of the military to work for a new and possibly suspect Commander-in-Chief.

On September 27, 1993, President Clinton addressed the United Nations General Assembly, using the occasion as did President Bush, to outline what he felt were the challenges to that body and the nations of the world:

"...the United Nations needs to ask hard questions before sending peacekeeping forces to more world trouble spots and must recognize that it cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts...if the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no...the United States has begun asking tougher questions about new peacekeeping missions such as: "Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified? How much will the mission cost?...From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions...When lives are on the line, you cannot let the reach of the UN exceed its grasp." (7:1-5)

Having reemphasized and recommitted the United States to a major role in peacekeeping, this administration now must address

strategy formulation to ensure that peacekeeping is included as one of the tenets of the national security strategy and to what lengths the UN can serve those ends.

...there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.

-- Machiavelli (8)

CHAPTER III

WHY A STRONG COMMITMENT TO PEACEKEEPING?

If current polls accurately reflect the American public's opinion on the United States' role in world peacekeeping, then the President's commitment is valid. (9) While an unconditional 67 percent is not the strongest of mandates, it does lend credibility and support to what has become, and is seen by many nations, as the United States' role in the international community and, of course, the United Nations.

But to fulfill the expected role, the national security strategy must address the peacekeeping mission in clear and

concise terms. With public opinion so closely divided, and with the images of Vietnam still visible to many, the administration must make clear where and when the nation will enter any operation.

To that end, the past administration in January, 1993, published the National Security Strategy of the United States. Although general in nature, this document is the first block in the foundation of US national security policy. In the preface, President Bush states,

"Our great nation stands at a crossroads in history...the world needs the leadership that only America can provide...Our policy has one overriding goal: real peace--not the illusory and fragile peace maintained by a balance of terror, but an enduring democratic peace based on shared values." (10:i-ii)

Within the policy statements, under a section that talks of influencing the future, the United Nations and peacekeeping role are specifically addressed. (10:7) The concepts laid down are again general in nature, but do provide a roadmap for the Department of Defense, the armed forces, and certainly for the Congress to assess the overall conduct and execution of policy. The opening paragraphs are in many ways a restatement of what President Bush said in his speech to the United Nations 47th General Assembly. However, and most importantly, those statements are now contained in a document that sets policy. Throughout this section, the United States' commitment to

peacekeeping is reiterated. The most definitive statement being, "...taking an active role in the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support". (10:7)

As a logical continuation of a changing security policy, this document also addresses "an agenda of new issues and opportunities" in the defense arena. (10:19) These "new" areas include:

- * Restructuring and reshaping the entire DoD, along with the development of new strategies and doctrine, and,
- * Significantly increase efforts to improve regional and United Nations conflict prevention efforts, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping capabilities.

It should be noted that the second area greatly influences how new developments in strategy and doctrine will be directed. Additionally, it signals a major change in each area for the individual armed services. In later portions of this paper, the point will be made that a strengthened United Nations' peacekeeping effort led by the US is in direct support of the national interests. Additionally, the Air Force's doctrine and operational capabilities in supporting those national interests will be evaluated as part of a growing peacekeeping effort.

Taking the National Security Strategy as it currently stands, and the related past and present senior administration's open commitments to furthering peacekeeping initiatives within the United Nations, it can be said the national security policy

does adequately address the commitment to support peacekeeping efforts. However, having simply addressed the need does not necessarily mean a clear direction and understanding of the application of the policy toward precise objectives.

The confused situation in Somalia, as well as the misdirected (or possibly misread) intentions to install the US/UN recognized government in Haiti, have left the administration in an urgent and demanding crisis regarding the national strategy in relation to these countries at this time. On the other hand, the successes seen in SOUTHERN WATCH and PROVIDE COMFORT add to the argument that if clear objectives are stated, then a positive result can be reached. The remedy may be simply a reassessment of how we conduct peacekeeping operations, as suggested by many members of Congress. (11:1)

If the national will is to support peacekeeping efforts with the United Nations, then we should make that jointness a reality. However, as the past has clearly shown, American popular opinion and support erode quickly in the absence of a clear policy or objective, or when American lives are placed in jeopardy for little or no gain. This key-point, although a matter of perception, may be what is lacking in the US strategy and may doom it to failure if not properly implemented.

President Clinton's address to the UN stressed the need to be selective in peacekeeping: don't go beyond the capabilities of the organization. This advice seems to also apply current events. The lesson of Somalia may simply be to "stick to a solid game plan and don't let personal interests divert [US] interests away from the original objective". (12)

The United States has clearly stated its support for peacekeeping as covered under the United Nations Charter in Chapter VI. It is important for senior policymakers to keep that in mind, and not let the "peace-enforcing" actions of Chapter VII get in the way. The blending of these two has led to what has been called "chapter 6 and 1/2" requirements. (4:50-51) This leads to a situation where humanitarian effort can suddenly turn to military confrontation and loss of life in armed combat. The tragic events in Somalia in 1993 and the associated public reaction are prime illustrations of how quickly that transformation can occur. (13:19 and 14:20) There is little doubt the public reluctance to send troops to Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on this concern. (15)

At a time like this, it is probably best to return to the cautions of the 18th century Prussian military theorist, General Karl Maria Von Clausewitz, on the likelihood of increased political interference in limited operations. This is especially

true in the arena that peacekeeping falls. Placing American military forces in an intractable and poorly understood situation clearly brings back visions of Vietnam, and from all accounts, the American people will not support such actions. Possibly now is the time for a "new" set of doctrinal guidelines as former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger outlined. These simple, yet insightful questions, proposed and provided a "yardstick" by which to measure if and how the US should respond to situations with military forces. It may be time for the current administration to review, add to, or even create a new "yardstick" for today's challenges. Tough, thoughtful questions may lead to a sound and better balanced policy.

*"The good opinion of mankind,
like the lever of Archimedes,
with the given fulcrum, moves
the world."*

*-- Thomas Jefferson,
Writings*

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE UNITED NATIONS SEES PEACEKEEPING

AND THE US ROLE

In a statement released on 31 January 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations, which had just completed the first

meeting at the Heads of State and Government level, directed that the Secretary-General prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient...the Charter... for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping." (16:1)

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reply was via a report, *An Agenda for Peace*, that may have set not only a historic precedent, but also may have opened the door to "collective security." For the first time since the Charter's signing, a Secretary-General openly advocated the use of Article 43 in conjunction with the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security as given under Article 42. (16:25) He went on to state, "...this will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis". (16:25-27)

With the door now open into what may turn into an authentic supranational arena, it is up to the United States as the sole remaining superpower to step-up to the task in an unprecedented and daring way. The United States has for many years seen itself

as a policeman to the world and, in fact, most of our military, diplomatic, and economic actions during the Cold War were designed to ensure that role. General Colin Powell's remark during the Gulf crisis is typical; "We are not the world's only policeman, but guess where people look when they need a cop."

(2:124) With the door open and the US as the leader, can Article 43 become a reality? The answer is neither simple nor, unfortunately, just a matter of putting forces in the field.

The basis supporting both Articles 42 and 43 is what history has just recently taught us: coalition operations are an effective means of collective security. Additionally, many contend that only the Cold War period prevented the implementation of Article 43.

The support to implement is wide spread:

"...to carry out the original intention of the UN's Founding Fathers. This is a major theme of Russian diplomacy. Senator David Boren of Oklahoma has written an influential article endorsing the proposal. It is reported to have wide support within Governor Clinton's advisory team. And Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of the German Republic, has issued a strong recommendation to the same effect as Chairman of a High Level Group of the Interaction Council, an international body whose members are former heads of government. Chancellor Schmidt's colleagues in the study on which his recommendation was based include former prime ministers of Great Britain, Canada, Mexico, Zambia, Nigeria, and Portugal, as well as sixteen "high level personalities," ranging from Henry Kissinger to Bronislaw Geremek." (2:110)

In contrast to past actions where war was seen as a continuation of politics, these leaders see the UN peacemaking

and peacekeeping as preferred political instruments to achieving international peace and security. Even the G7 leaders in London in July, 1991, committed themselves to a stronger UN in view of how it can be used to improve human rights, maintain peace, and deter aggression. As the Secretary-General noted,

"...the UN is a gathering of sovereign states and what it can do depends on the common ground that can be created between them...opportunity has been regained...this post-Cold War vision parallels that of the victorious Western Allies as they led the way to the founding of post-Second War institutions for economic coordination and for maintenance of peace and security. Now, nearly a half century later, visionaries believe the UN could be revitalized." (2:126)

So, if the United States is to be part of that "visionary" leadership, then what direction best suits attaining the national interests?

Keeping the realities of force drawdown clearly in view and realizing the force structure that is envisioned by 1997, US forces will be best used in coalition operations, whether in a war or major peacekeeping event. (17:8) In other words, the US no longer wishes to unilaterally commit forces or even monetary support to any major effort, but prefers a collective effort. Additionally, with the close of the Cold War, many other nations that traditionally supplied forces and equipment to the UN have also started drawdowns within their military forces. With these realities firmly in mind, the US must be the catalyst for the

genuine process of collective security offered by the United Nations Charter.

As with most international efforts, the foundation must start at home. As President Clinton stated, the United States is fully committed to strengthening the United Nations. The key is convincing a smaller, and continuing to down-size, military to commit to realistically moving toward the new "combined effort" that being part of a standing UN force would require. (18:8-11) If the problems of making US service jointness a reality are any indication of the problems to be faced by building a collective force, then a lot of arm-twisting will have to be done.

Another obstacle will be at the international political level. The political reality of power relationships between sovereign states and the renewed rise of nationalism being seen around the world, tend to suppress the concepts of supranationalism. If the US is to be successful, some of the tactics used to gain alliances such as, NATO, SEATO, the OAS, and of course, the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Coalition will again be required. The requirement for diplomatic efforts will probably be monumental, and will only be rivaled by the size of the effort required to convince US military senior leaders.

Once the required internal and external decisions have been made, the actual structure to be created will have to be decided.

Although, there is a current Military Staff Committee within the UN, it is probably not capable of supporting a standing force. To make the force viable, more than troops and logistics will be required; a foundation will have to be laid for a UN military command structure. Further, that structure must be given operational command and control over assigned forces. The success of the UN force will hinge on a solid mandate from all nations, which takes the problem of developing such a force full circle.

Given these problems, and all the associated baggage each will carry, the way is still clear to create a United Nations security force with the role of world peacekeeper. Although, the problems seem to make that concept unworkable, the reality of the United States no longer being the "world's policeman" is equally ominous. Only a properly constituted and viable UN force can ensure the best interests of nations seeking worldwide peace.

So where does this UN vision lead the US in its quest for a strategy on peacekeeping? Although there seems to be divergent paths, ranging from forming collectives or coalitions for security to building a standing force (the UN ideal), it is evident that both views are firmly rooted in the greater "international system".

"History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilizations unite and divide mankind...Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for."

-- Samuel P. Huntington,
*The Clash of
Civilizations*

CHAPTER V

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE: DOES IT MEET THE NEED?

Following the lead set under the National Security Strategy policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published and sent to the Secretary of Defense the 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces. The Chairman in the cover memorandum states,

"...The report describes those issues reviewed and provides specific recommendations for improvements needed to maintain the maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces." (20)

One of the recommended improvements was the creation of a new unified command. This command would be responsible for all CONUS-based forces focusing on facilitating training, preparation, and rapid response of forces to wherever needed. Additionally, this would allow forces to be merged into joint training and readiness. (20:xi) Further, in an effort to cover

the need for support to peacekeeping efforts, the CINC would also be assigned other functional responsibilities, to include:

"...undertaking principal responsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose." (20:xi-xii)

On 1 October 1993, the new command, known as US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), was activated. The following forces were merged under the new unified CINC: the Army's Forces Command (USFORSCOM), the Navy's Atlantic Fleet (USLANTCOM), the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic (USMARFORLANT), Special Operations Command Atlantic (SOCLANT), and the Air Forces Atlantic (USAFSLANT). (20:xi)

Now that a unified command has been created and has specific tasks within the peacekeeping arena, the component services need to address these tasks within respective service doctrine. To this end, the Air Force is currently rewriting *Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. However, the current *AFM 1-1* (Mar, 92) does a good job in covering what governs the use of air power in the "domain of military activities below the level of war." (21:3) In addition, the inherent flexibility of air power makes it ideally suited for peacekeeping operations. Bosnia is a viable and appropriate example. Originally, air forces were limited to humanitarian relief through airdrops of food and medical

supplies, but later employed to enforce the UN-backed "no-fly zone."

Although discussions have centered on the increased role in the UN peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, the use of air power in this limited role has proven to be more acceptable and less of a risk politically. However, should air power be used in a direct intervention on behalf of ground forces or in an air-to-air engagement, it would be hard to gauge the overall reaction of the American public and certainly the reaction of belligerent forces. Using the reaction to American losses in Somalia, the most likely reaction would be negative.

As a basis for continued support of peacekeeping efforts, Air Force doctrine as presently written appears to be definitive and sufficient for commanders to properly train crews and employ air power to accomplish the mission.

*"The question is," said Alice,
'whether you can make words mean so
many things.'*

*'The question is,' said Humpty
Dumpty, 'which is to be
master--that's all.'"*

*-- Lewis Carroll, Through
The Looking Glass*

CHAPTER VI

IS THE AIR FORCE READY OPERATIONALLY FOR PEACEKEEPING?

Although the "are we ready" question is answered on a daily basis by every wing commander through a structured training and evaluation program, the crux of "are we ready for peacekeeping" lies more in guidance than in the actual employment of forces. With the Air Force training for a wide variety of roles, from airlift to strategic operations, and with the concept of "Global Reach - Global Power," the force is capable throughout the spectrum of conflict, including peacekeeping needs as envisioned today. However, will that be good enough for the future if the UN adopts President Bush's and President Clinton's recommendations?

The lessons learned from coalition operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm have given the Air Force a superb foundation for increasing joint and combined training to support international or UN combined operations. The key is to build upon those lessons and expand present training to address the combined role peacekeeping requires.

If we elect to pursue combined peacekeeping operations, several issues highlighted by previous experiences must be resolved by operational planners. These issues involve

difficulties noted in peacekeeping operations and the requirement for increased emphasis in: "...joint and combined force liaison...consistent mission analysis...clear command and control relationships...effective communications facilities...effective public diplomacy and PSYOP." (23)

Recent experience has shown current AF operational capabilities can meet the need of peacekeeping missions. If the role is expanded into a truly combined force under UN control and auspices, operational planners may have to address the above concerns within the current training programs. The addition of new concepts is not something foreign to AF training, but unlike a new weapons system or tactic, the visibility of action and the overall impact of the mission may have even greater consequences.

As a point of closure, The Chairman of the JCS announced the establishment of a Joint Warfighting Center (JWC). The center will function under the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) and will replace the JWC at Hurlburt Field and the Joint Doctrine Center in Norfolk. The JWC will take advantage of state-of-art technology to enhance operations. It is expected to stand-up in about 10 to 15 months. (4:113)

Hopefully, this will be the services' answer to some of the gaps, plus provide a place to educate senior leaders. Watching the further success of US-joint operations may provide the ultimate

model for the expanded peacekeeping needs of the United Nations and the world at large.

*"Know the enemy and know yourself;
in a hundred battles you will never
be in peril...When you are ignorant
of the enemy but know yourself,
your chances of winning or losing
are equal...If ignorant both of
your enemy and of yourself, you are
certain in every battle to be in
peril."*

-- Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

If the United States is to maintain its position in the world arena and as a strong supporter of the United Nations' efforts, then a comprehensive national security strategy, followed by solid service doctrine and operational directives must be created and followed. As President Bush pointed out, the United States is no longer in the containment business, but has moved into the collective or interdependent role. (10:2) Part of that new role is the United Nations as the "world's primary legitimizing agent in matters of peacekeeping." (4:51) The weakest link in making this happen for the United States appears

to be within the political mechanism which has the leading role in defining the objective of using the armed forces to support these efforts and subsequently, in the organizing of other nations to support that expanded effort.

If Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" as related to waging war has any value, and past experiences do attest to the validity, then having a government with clear strategy, supported by the people, and enforceable by military force(s) is as equally critical to peacekeeping. (24) Taking this to its ultimate end within the international arena, the United Nations could be at the center of that triangle of harmony, thereby enabling support and forces to keep the peace.

The facts presented above validate the original thesis of this paper. Not all aspects of international peacekeeping have been thoroughly considered in the national objectives, the national military strategy, or the military forces that support that strategy. At the service level, the best reading available to military commanders seeking to understand this new arena comes from a joint publication that does a good job in capturing the problem of collective action:

"...an essential consideration is an understanding of the parameters that spell success, failure, or conflict termination...Only by understanding US policy, goals, and considerations can the military commander hope to integrate his efforts with those other engaged agencies..." (25:11)

The need for clearly developed and well-defined concepts, strategies, policies, and doctrine is more important now than ever before. Future actions in the combined environment will demand the single clarity of purpose that in the past has escaped even the most senior officials.

It is evident most actions, including national policy, are still in the infant stages. Considering President Bush made his first address to the UN less than three years ago, and President Clinton has only been in office for 14 months, this is understandable. However, the problems that plague the world cannot wait long for any administration without inviting disaster.

...it simply requires different forces and a completely different concept. An intention to deter and enforce requires forces which are as frightening as possible. For this kind of mission great power battalions, professional soldiers and all the means at their disposal are preferable. (18:6)

-- General Hagglund,
Finnish Commander to
UNIFIL

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